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I.

INTRODUCTION

17 U.S.C. § 106 states:
[T]he owner of [a] copyright . . . has the exclusive rights
to do and to authorize any of the following: . . . (4) in the
case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic
works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other
audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work
publicly; . . . and (6) in the case of sound recordings, to
perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of a
1
digital audio transmission.

* This is an updated and revised version of an article that first appeared in
the American Bar Association’s Entertainment and Sports Lawyer. Todd Brabec, The
Performance Right: A World in Transition, 31 ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 1 (2015).
† Todd Brabec, Esq., former ASCAP Executive Vice President and
Worldwide Director of Membership, is a Deems Taylor Award-winning co-author
with Jeff Brabec. See JEFFREY BRABEC & TODD BRABEC, MUSIC, MONEY AND SUCCESS:
THE INSIDER’S GUIDE TO MAKING MONEY IN THE MUSIC BUSINESS (7th ed. 2011). He is
also an Adjunct Professor at University of Southern California, where he teaches
Music Licensing, Music Publishing and Film, Television and Video Game Scoring,
and Song Contracts; a Governing Committee member of the American Bar

16
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These two exclusive rights of copyright are at the heart of the
worldwide business of music. They involve musical compositions
and sound recordings, rights of copyright owners and limitations
on those rights, and how creators and copyright owners are
compensated.
II. THE MUSIC BUSINESS PRE-DIGITAL
In the world of traditional media—primarily radio and
television—music licensing has evolved into a fairly straightforward
process. For musical compositions, songwriters, composers, and
music publishers join or affiliate with the American Society of
Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP), Broadcast Music,
Inc. (BMI), or SESAC, which are performing rights organizations
(PROs) who negotiate license agreements for the use of music,
collect the fees, and distribute them back to writers and publishers
2
who have performances in specific media. If a PRO and a user
cannot agree on license fees, courts intervene and determine
3
“reasonable fees” for music use.
In the area of sound recordings, performances on traditional
over-the-air radio are exempt from royalties and considered to be
4
“promotional” tools to drive sales. A record company’s main
source of income, other than record sales, comes from the
licensing of master recordings to television series, feature films, and
advertising commercials, among other uses. And then came the
digital world—a technological revolution that changed everything.
This is a rather simplistic view of the music business, but one
that serves as an appropriate starting point for an increasingly
complex and changing business.
III. MUSICAL COMPOSITIONS
In the United States, there are three primary organizations
that represent songwriters, composers, and music publishers on a
non-exclusive basis in the negotiation, collection, and distribution
Association Forum on the Entertainment and Sports Industries; and an
entertainment industry consultant and attorney. He can be contacted at
toddbrabec@gmail.com or http://www.musicandmoney.com.
1. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012).
2. See infra Part III.
3. See infra Part III (discussing Rate Courts).
4. See infra Part VII.
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of music performance license fees. The organizations are the
5
6
7
ASCAP, BMI, and SESAC. The primary sources of license fees are
traditional radio, broadcast and cable television, and general
licensing (e.g., live performance, music in bars and restaurants,
8
etc.).
New media license fees, which include online and digital
music services, currently represent a relatively small portion of U.S.
domestic music license fees (approximately $150 million of a total
9
annual domestic PRO collection of $1.5 billion). Royalty
distributions are made—fifty percent to writers and fifty percent to
music publishers—after operating costs (approximately twelve to
thirteen percent in the cases of ASCAP and BMI) are taken into
10
account. There is a PRO in practically every country of the world
where, via reciprocal agreements with ASCAP, BMI, and SESAC,
U.S. writers’ and publishers’ works are represented and paid for
11
when performances occur in foreign territories.
ASCAP and BMI entered into Consent Decrees with the
federal government in 1941, with amendments to those Decrees in
1950, 1960, and 2001 in the case of ASCAP, and amendments in
12
1966 and 1994 in the case of BMI. One aspect of these Decrees,
which has had a significant effect on the determination of license

5. 4 ALEXANDER LINDEY & MICHAEL LANDAU, LINDEY ON ENTERTAINMENT,
PUBLISHING AND THE ARTS § 8:52 (3d ed.), Westlaw (database updated Jan. 2016).
6. Id. § 8:55.
7. Id. § 8:58.
8. See Todd Brabec & Jeff Brabec, Performing Rights Licensing in the United
States: A World of Multiple Choices, Considerations, and Results, 30 ENT. & SPORTS LAW.
8, 8 (2012).
9. See AM. SOC’Y OF COMPOSERS, AUTHORS & PUBLISHERS, ASCAP ANNUAL
REPORT 2014, at 17 (2014), http://www.ascap.com/~/media/files/pdf/about
/annual-reports/ascap_annual_report_2014.pdf [hereinafter ASCAP REPORT];
BROAD. MUSIC, INC., BMI ANNUAL REVIEW 2013–2014, at 12 (2014),
http://www.bmi.com/pdfs/publications/2014/BMI_Annual_Review_2014.pdf
[hereinafter BMI REVIEW]. SESAC is a private for-profit corporation that does not
publicly disclose its financial information. Reliable estimates are provided by the
author.
10. See LINDEY & LANDAU, supra note 5, §§ 8:52, 8:55; ASCAP Payment System,
ASCAP, http://www.ascap.com/members/payment/royalties.aspx (last visited
Feb. 8, 2016); General Royalty Information, BMI, http://www.bmi.com/creators
/royalty/general_information (last visited Feb. 8, 2016).
11. See infra Part III.
12. Michael A. Einhorn, Intellectual Property and Antitrust: Music Performing
Rights in Broadcasting, 24 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 349, 349 (2001).
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fees, is the existence of a separate “Rate Court” for ASCAP and
BMI, which comes into play when the PRO and a music user
cannot come to a negotiated agreement as to what “reasonable”
13
license fees should be in any given area. The Decrees allow any
party to apply to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
14
New York for a determination of interim and final fees. These
Rate Courts have been in existence with ASCAP since 1950 and
with BMI since 1994, and they have determined fees and license
terms for the major traditional media areas of radio and broadcast
and cable television as well as in recent years, the online music
15
community. It is in these latter “new media” decisions and
16
settlements where most of today’s complex issues have arisen.
SESAC, the smallest of the PROs, operates on a for-profit basis
as opposed to the non-profit operations of ASCAP and BMI. SESAC
is not governed by a Consent Decree with the government and does
not have a “Rate Court” type procedure for license fee
17
adjudications and disputes. Under a recent October 2014
settlement with the Television Music License Committee (TMLC)
regarding a class action antitrust suit involving local television
stations though, SESAC has agreed, as part of the settlement, to
binding arbitration for any future licensing fee disputes with the
18
settlement class that cannot be resolved by negotiation. It was
further agreed that SESAC could not interfere with the ability of
any affiliate to issue a public performance rights license directly to
19
a settlement class member. In July 2015, SESAC also came to a
settlement with the Radio Music Licensing Committee (RMLC) to
end antitrust litigation anticompetitive behavior regarding license
20
fees. As part of the settlement, SESAC agreed to binding
arbitration if future negotiated license fee discussions were

13. See id. at 356.
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See, e.g., Broad. Music, Inc. v. Pandora Media, Inc., Nos. 13 Civ. 4037(LLS),
64 Civ. 3787(LLS), 2013 WL 6697788, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2013).
17. Einhorn, supra note 12, at 355.
18. Meredith Corp. v. SESAC, LLC, 87 F. Supp. 3d 650, 657 (S.D.N.Y. 2015);
Meredith Corp. v. SESAC, LLC, 1 F. Supp. 3d 180 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
19. Meredith Corp., 87 F. Supp. 3d at 657.
20. William Velez, Radio Industry and SESAC Reach Settlement, RADIO MUSIC
LICENSE COMMITTEE (July 23, 2015), http://www.radiomlc.org/pages/6282116
.php.
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unsuccessful, as well as provisions allowing writers and publishers
21
more flexibility in granting direct licenses to radio stations.
In the online world of music licensing, the ASCAP Rate Court
has been instrumental in deciding not only what “reasonable”
license fees should be, but also what is actually licensable by PROs.
Interim fee and final fee decisions have involved many of the
biggest players in the “new media/technology” world and have
resulted in license fees significantly below what PROs and copyright
22
owners were requesting. To put the online fees into perspective,
ASCAP, BMI, and SESAC collected approximately $1.5 billion in
domestic U.S. license fees (e.g., radio, broadcast television, cable
23
television, live performance). Of this amount, approximately $150
24
million was generated from all online/digital uses. PROs receive
an additional $700 million each year from foreign collection
societies (e.g., PRS, GEMA, SACEM, SIAE, SGAE, SOCAN, APRA,
IMRO, JASRAC, BUMA) for performances of U.S. writers’ works
performed in foreign countries, with a small portion of that money
25
attributable to online use. Most publishers, incidentally, collect
their foreign country performance royalties directly from those
societies as direct members or through sub-publishers.
Commencing with the 2007 AOL/RealNetworks/Yahoo case, Rate
Court filings, hearings, and decisions have involved YouTube,
MobiTV, AT&T Mobility, Verizon Wireless, Spotify, Ericsson, and
Netflix, among others. A brief summary of some of the most
important points of these cases should help in understanding the
26
current status of online performance licensing.
The AOL/RealNetworks/Yahoo Rate Court case had major
worldwide significance as there was a summary judgment ruling
that the downloading of a music file did not constitute a public

21. Id.
22. See, e.g., United States v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors, & Publishers
(AOL/RealNetworks/Yahoo I), 485 F. Supp. 2d 438, 441 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
23. See ASCAP REPORT, supra note 9, at 17; BMI REVIEW, supra note 9, at 13.
SESAC estimates provided by the author.
24. See ASCAP REPORT, supra note 9, at 15; BMI REVIEW, supra note 9, at 3.
SESAC estimates provided by the author.
25. ASCAP REPORT, supra note 9, at 15, 17; BMI REVIEW, supra note 9, at 12.
SESAC estimates provided by the author.
26. See Todd Brabec & Jeff Brabec, Online Music Licensing: From PROs, AOL,
and MobiTV to SoundExchange, AT&T, and the CRB, 29 ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 1
(2011).
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27

performance under the Copyright Act —a ruling totally contrary
28
to the laws of most other countries, with the exception of Canada.
This decision was affirmed by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals,
29
with certiorari denied by the U.S. Supreme Court. The circuit
court also remanded the fee formula back to the district court for
30
further proceedings. The 2009 Verizon Wireless Rate Court case
reaffirmed the “no performance in a download” decision in a
ruling that stated that the transmission of a ringtone to a cellular
telephone customer did not constitute a performance and the
mechanical ringtone rate of twenty-four cents per download was
31
the only appropriate right and compensation involved. The
primary issue of the 2009 AT&T case was whether previews of
ringtones were to be considered “fair use” rather than licensable
32
performances. The court ruled in favor of ASCAP, and a
customer’s previewing of ringtones was therefore licensable by
33
PROs.
A 2009 interim fee decision regarding YouTube is a good
example of the size of court-set “reasonable” music license fees,
34
with an order of $70,000 a month. The 2010 MobiTV case involved
what a reasonable license fee should be for the delivering of
television programming to mobile telephones and audio
35
channels. In this case, the court returned to the early 1990s
ASCAP performance licenses with Turner Broadcasting, which set a
36
three-tiered license based on the music intensity of the program.
27. See AOL/RealNetworks/Yahoo I, 485 F. Supp. at 441.
28. See David M. Given, A Modern Pandora’s Box Music, the Internet, and the
Dilemma of Clearing Public Performance Rights, 26 ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 1, 19 (2008).
29. See United States v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors, & Publishers
(AOL/RealNetworks/Yahoo II), 627 F.3d 64, 73 (2d Cir. 2010) (“The downloaded
songs are not performed in any perceptible manner during the transfers; the user
must take some further action to play the songs after they are downloaded.”), cert.
denied, 132 S. Ct. 366 (2011).
30. Id. at 76.
31. In re Cellco P’ship (Verizon Wireless), 663 F. Supp. 2d 363, 374–75
(S.D.N.Y. 2009).
32. United States v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors, & Publishers (AT&T),
599 F. Supp. 2d 415, 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
33. See id. at 434.
34. United States v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors, & Publishers
(YouTube), 616 F. Supp. 2d 447, 455 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
35. In re Application of MobiTV, Inc. (MobiTV I), 712 F. Supp. 2d 206, 232
(S.D.N.Y. 2010).
36. Id. at 222.
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The music intensive fee was 0.9% of defined revenue with a 0.375%
fee for general entertainment and a 0.1375% fee for news and
37
sports programming. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals
38
affirmed the lower court’s decision.
All of the aforementioned cases were eventually settled with
additional settlements and agreements entered into with Apple
Radio, Spotify, Netflix, and Hulu, as well as others. Practically all
settlements in this area are confidential.
IV. DMX AND PANDORA
Two additional Rate Court cases, DMX and Pandora, involved
not only the determination of reasonable license fees, but also the
39
role that direct licensing plays in the PRO licensing picture.
Under the ASCAP and BMI Consent Decrees, the agreements that
writers and music publishers sign with ASCAP and BMI are nonexclusive; members and affiliates are allowed to directly license
their works to a music user and bypass the PRO structures
40
entirely.
DMX is a leading background and foreground music service
provider that provides pre-programmed music for business
establishments via direct broadcast satellites or on premise delivery
41
mechanisms. DMX hired a company to assist and design a direct
licensing program with copyright owners which eventually resulted
in direct licenses representing over 7,000 catalogues, including one
42
major music publisher, Sony. DMX requested from ASCAP and
BMI a “through to the audience” blanket license which reflected
the DMX direct licenses already obtained as well as those to be
43
negotiated in the future.
In July of 2010, the BMI Rate Court entered a final rate for the
blanket license, subject to adjustment of DMX’s BMI directly
37. Id.
38. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors, & Publishers v. MobiTV, Inc. (MobiTV
II), 681 F.3d 76, 88 (2d Cir. 2012).
39. Pandora Media, Inc. v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors, & Publishers
(Pandora II), 6 F. Supp. 3d 317, 320 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), aff’d, 785 F.3d 73 (2d Cir.
2015); Broad. Music, Inc. v. DMX, Inc. (DMX I), 726 F. Supp. 2d 355, 355
(S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff’d, (DMX II) 683 F.3d 32 (2d Cir. 2012).
40. Einhorn, supra note 12, at 353.
41. DMX II, 683 F.3d at 37.
42. Id. at 38.
43. Id. at 38–39.
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44

licensed performances. In a separate decision, the ASCAP Rate
Court ruled that ASCAP is required to issue to DMX a blanket
45
license with “carve outs” for the direct licensing program. Both
decisions were appealed to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
46
which, in June of 2012, affirmed the district court decisions. The
resulting rates significantly reduced the license fees that DMX was
paying to ASCAP and BMI.
Pandora is the leading Internet customized radio service and is
considered a non-interactive service, as opposed to an on
demand/interactive service where the user chooses what they want
47
to hear. Pandora entered into license agreements with both
ASCAP and BMI in 2005 and terminated those licenses at the end
48
of 2010 and 2012 respectively. In the case of ASCAP, Pandora
applied to the court for a “through to the audience” blanket license
49
for the period 2011 through 2015. In the case of BMI, Pandora
filed an application for a five-year license commencing January 1,
50
2013.
Based primarily on the small license fees that were awarded by
the ASCAP and BMI Rate Court judges, commencing with the
AOL/RealNetworks/Yahoo case in 2007, the major music publishers,
starting with EMI (later acquired by Sony), notified ASCAP and
BMI that they were withdrawing their catalogues for online
51
licensing purposes. The major publishers felt strongly that they
could negotiate more financially acceptable online value deals than
the arrangements that had been set by prior Rate Court decisions
52
and the subsequent settlements emanating from those decisions.

44. DMX I, 726 F. Supp. 2d at 355–56.
45. In re THP Capstar Acquisition Corp., 756 F. Supp. 2d 516, 552 (S.D.N.Y.
2010).
46. DMX II, 683 F.3d at 49.
47. Pandora II, 6 F. Supp. 3d 317, 327, 332 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), aff’d, 785 F.3d 73
(2d Cir. 2015).
48. See Broad. Music, Inc. v. Pandora Media, Inc., No. 13 Civ. 4037(LLS),
2013 WL 6697788, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2013); In re Pandora Media, Inc.
(Pandora I), No. 12 Civ. 8035(DLC), 2013 WL 5211927, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17,
2013), aff’d sub nom. Pandora Media, Inc. v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors &
Publishers, 785 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 2015).
49. Pandora I, 2013 WL 5211927, at *1.
50. Broad. Music, Inc., 2013 WL 6697788, at *2.
51. Pandora I, 2013 WL 5211927, at *2–3; Broad. Music, Inc., 2013 WL
6697788, at *3.
52. Pandora I, 2013 WL 5211927, at *3.
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These online media withdrawals were accomplished by specific
changes in the rules, regulations, and practices of ASCAP and
53
BMI. Upon withdrawing their works, a number of the publishers
54
entered into direct licensing deals with Pandora, in effect creating
a system whereby Pandora had licenses with ASCAP, BMI, and
SESAC, as well as short-term negotiated direct performance
licenses with the major publishers. Discussions were also held
between ASCAP, BMI, and the major publishers with a view toward
ASCAP and BMI handling the administration of the online licenses
negotiated by the publishers.
In response to a motion for summary judgment in September
2013, Judge Denise Cote, the ASCAP judge, ruled that a selective
withdrawal of new media rights by publisher members could not be
55
implemented without violating the Consent Decree. Judge Cote
further ruled that the ASCAP repertory subject to that license was
all works in ASCAP at the time Pandora applied for a license
56
(January 1, 2011), not when the final license arrived. In short, an
application for a license is treated as a license in effect, and in this
case, no works could be removed by any ASCAP member during
the period of 2011 through 2015. Prior to this decision, interim
licenses were never considered “licenses in effect” until such time
as a final Rate Court decision was rendered or an agreement was
reached. Further, when works are finally removed by any
publishers, those works have to be removed for all licensing
57
purposes, not just for online licensing. Any users with license
agreements still in effect at the time of the withdrawal could
continue to use the withdrawn works up until their specific license
58
agreement expires.
In a similar summary judgment hearing in the BMI case, Judge
Louis Stanton allowed the removal of works which occurred prior
to January 1, 2013, but ruled that those works could not be licensed
by BMI to any others after any existing license agreements
59
expired. If BMI cannot offer those compositions to new media

53. Id. at *2.
54. Id. at *3.
55. Id. at *10–11.
56. Id. at *11.
57. Id. at *9.
58. Id.
59. Broad. Music, Inc. v. Pandora Media, Inc., No. 13 Civ. 4037(LLS), 2013
WL 6697788, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2013).
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applicants, their availability does not meet the standards of the BMI
60
Decree and they cannot be held in the BMI repertory.
To put both judges’ “all in or all out” summary judgment
decisions into a real world perspective, if one were to remove works
from the current $150 million PRO annual license fee area of the
online world, one would be forced, eventually, to remove those
works from the other $1.35 billion in PRO domestic license fees
being generated by traditional media (e.g., radio, broadcast
television, cable television, live). Not to mention the effect that
such withdrawals would have on the reciprocal “flow through of
money” agreements between foreign collection societies and U.S.
PROs. As a point of reference, it is important to note that
practically all new PRO licensing deals with traditional media
include streaming, website music uses, mobile apps, digital and
primary broadcasts, mobile and wireless platforms, webcasts, and
multi-casts.
On March 14, 2014, Judge Cote issued her “determination of
reasonable license fees” in a 136-page decision in the Pandora Rate
61
Court case. The judge ruled that the appropriate fee for the years
62
2011 through 2015 was 1.85% of revenue less certain deductions.
ASCAP had requested a rate of 1.85% for 2011 and 2012, 2.5% for
63
2013, and 3% for 2014 and 2015. Pandora had requested a rate
between 1.7% (the current traditional radio rate—Pandora had
acquired a small radio station in an attempt to qualify for this rate)
and 1.85% (the ASCAP form rate in effect for Pandora since
64
2005).
Two of the more important issues in the Pandora Rate Court
proceedings involve: first, the concept of the divisibility of
copyrights, which allows a publisher or copyright owner to make
deals with various classes of users for their catalogue, and second,
the disparity in payments between artists and record companies
and songwriters and music publishers for the same type of
65
performance.
As to the latter issue, the AOL/RealNetworks/Yahoo 2007 Rate
Court case provided evidence of more than $30 million paid by
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at *4.
In re Pandora Media, Inc., 6 F. Supp. 3d 317, 317 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
Id. at 372.
Id. at 320.
Id.
Id.
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these services to the major record companies over a two-year
period, whereas their fees to PROs were, in comparison, very
66
According to Pandora’s Securities and Exchange
small.
Commission Form 10-K filing, the company expended
approximately 48% of its total revenue of $920.8 million on
67
Content Acquisition costs in 2014. As to the 48% figure, 44%
represented costs for internet transmissions of sound recordings
(primarily to SoundExchange, as well as some direct license with
labels), with the remaining 4% paid for the musical composition
68
performance right (PROs and music publishers).
In July of 2014, ASCAP—with Universal Music Publishing,
Sony/ATV Music, and EMI Music as intervenors—appealed the two
69
district court opinions to the Second Circuit. The basis of the
appeal was that the district court erred in ruling that the Amended
Final Judgment of 2001 (AFJ 2) prohibited ASCAP from accepting
partial grants of public performance rights and that the district
court, in setting a final license fee, ignored recent arm’s length
70
relevant benchmark agreements.
As to the “partial grants” prohibition, ASCAP’s position was
that the Consent Decree long ago removed any prohibition on the
right of members to reserve for themselves the right to grant
71
exclusive licensing rights to music users. Further, such a
prohibition is in direct conflict with the exclusive rights provided
72
by the copyright law to copyright owners.
As to the issue of ignoring benchmark agreements in the
setting of final reasonable license fees, ASCAP pointed out that the
Sony/ATV Music, EMI Music, and Universal Music Pandora direct
73
license deals were all in excess of the 1.85% court set fee, as was
the 2013 negotiated ASCAP Apple iTunes radio license—all “arms

66. See AOL/RealNetworks/Yahoo I, 485 F. Supp. 2d 438 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
67. PANDORA MEDIA, INC., ANNUAL REPORT (Form 10-K) 247 (Jan. 31, 2012),
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1230276/000119312512120024
/d280023d10k.htm.
68. Id. at 20.
69. Brief of Respondent-Appellant, Pandora Media, Inc. v. Am. Soc’y of
Composers, Authors, & Publishers, No. 14-1158-cv(L) (2d Cir. July 28, 2014), 2014
WL 3887402.
70. Id. at *2, *5, *29.
71. Id. at *25.
72. Id. at *26.
73. Id. at *19.
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length willing buyer and willing seller agreements.” Further, the
Second Circuit, in its 2010 AOL/RealNetworks/Yahoo decision,
confirmed that a 2.5% rate was a valid benchmark even though it
vacated the district court’s across-the-board application of that rate
75
to all of Yahoo and RealNetwork’s services. Accordingly, the
current “District Court erred in ignoring [the Second Circuit’s]
guidance in RealNetworks, which established that a rate of 2.5%
revenue (or higher) is reasonable for all-audio, music-intensive
76
digital music services similar to Pandora’s.”
In May 2015, the Second Circuit affirmed the March 2014
Federal Rate Court decision, which set the rate of the ASCAP
blanket license at 1.85% of revenue and prevented music
publishers from partially withdrawing the public performance
77
licensing rights from ASCAP.
As to the BMI/Pandora Media litigation concerning
reasonable fees and terms for an adjustable fee blanket license,
Judge Stanton issued a decision—after a five-week jury trial—on
May 27, 2015, that the 2.5% of revenue rate and other terms
78
offered by BMI to Pandora were reasonable. The 2.5% of gross
revenue is subject to adjustments to accommodate performances of
79
works that Pandora licensed directly. Further, Pandora may
deduct up to 15% of commissions paid to third party advertising
80
agencies. The benchmarks the judge relied upon in determining
the “reasonable” fee included those between Pandora, Sony EMI,
and the Universal Music Group, which ranged from 2.25% to
5.85% of Pandora’s revenue; the direct licenses with EMI and
BMG; its license with ASCAP; and BMI’s agreement with the
81
RMLC. The term of the deal is four years and runs from 2013
82
through 2016. Pandora subsequently appealed the decision to the
83
Second Circuit.
74. Id. at *9.
75. Id. at *21.
76. Id. at *27.
77. Pandora Media, Inc. v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors, & Publishers
(Pandora III), 785 F.3d 73, 75 (2d Cir. 2015).
78. Broad. Music, Inc. v. Pandora Media, Inc., No. 13 Civ. 4037(LLS), 2015
WL 3526105, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. May 28, 2015).
79. Id. at *24–25.
80. Id. at *26.
81. Id. at *23–24.
82. Id. at *26.
83. See Broad. Music, Inc., 2015 WL 3526105, at *1, appeal docketed, No. 15-2060
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V. DIRECT LICENSING
The ability of a copyright owner to directly license a work to a
music user and bypass PROs was a major issue in the
AOL/RealNetworks/Yahoo and BMI/DMX Rate Court decisions, as
84
well as the current Pandora litigation. Language in both the
ASCAP and BMI Consent Decrees guarantee the right of any
85
member or affiliate to directly license their works to a user.
SESAC, as it is not under a Consent Decree with the government,
incorporates the following language in its writer and publisher
affiliation agreements that insures the right to directly license:
“Publisher retains the right to issue non-exclusive licenses directly
to any third person for the public performance in the U.S., its
territories and possessions, of any work subject to this
86
Agreement.”
When songwriters, composers, and music publishers join or
affiliate with ASCAP, BMI, or SESAC, they sign representation
agreements granting to the PRO the non-exclusive right to license
the non-dramatic public performances of their works. Though each
PRO contract and governing documents are different as to terms,
length of contract, withdrawal of works, resignation or termination
provisions, dispute resolution procedures, payments schedules,
distribution rules, and benefits, they all are non-exclusive
agreements whereby the writer or publisher can license a work
87
directly. PROs cannot interfere in any way with this right or the
ability to exercise this right.
Language as to the ability to direct license as well as the effect
of a direct license has been standard in many types of industry

(2d Cir. 2015).
84. See Pandora III, 785 F.3d 73, 76 (2d Cir. 2015); see also Broad. Music, Inc.,
2015 WL 3526105, at *6–7.
85. See Broad. Music, Inc., 2015 WL 3526105, at *6–7.
86. See generally Todd Brabec & Jeff Brabec, Performing Rights Licensing in the
United States: A World of Multiple Choices, Considerations, and Results, 30 ENT. &
SPORTS LAW. 8, 10 (2012) (discussing the standard SESAC writer or publisher
affiliation agreement).
87. See, e.g., AM. SOC’Y OF COMPOSERS, AUTHORS & PUBLISHERS, ASCAP
PUBLISHER AGREEMENTS 1–3 (2015), http://www.ascap.com/~/media/files/pdf
/join/ascap-publisher-agreement.pdf (last visited Feb. 8, 2016); BROAD. MUSIC,
INC., WRITER APPLICATION 3 (2014), http://www.bmi.com/forms/affiliation/bmi
_writer_kit.pdf (May 2014).
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license agreements, including work-for-hire and employee-for-hire
contracts for many decades. A sample clause might read:
The performing rights in the composition, to the extent
permitted by law, shall be assigned to and licensed by the
applicable [PRO] with said organization authorized to collect and
receive all monies earned from the public performance of the
composition and to pay the writers and publishers directly. If to the
extent it is unlawful for the PRO, or any of its affiliates, to issue
blanket small performing right licenses or the applicable
performing rights society does not from time to time, for any
reason whatsoever maintain a regular system of collecting
performance fees and/or a third party licensee (i.e., a television
network, independent television station, digital music service, etc.)
requires direct licensing of such rights, company and publisher
shall have the right to directly license their respective shares of the
public performances rights in the composition to such third
parties. If the company or publishing designee receives a
distribution of earned public performance fees from any source
that does not make a separate distribution directly or indirectly to
publisher and to composer, then publisher shall be entitled to
receive its portion of such fees and composer shall be entitled to
receive the writer’s share of such fees.
Additional variations of a direct license clause are as follows:
Licensee desires to obtain from publisher a blanket license for
all necessary performance, reproduction and distribution rights
implicated by the delivery of programming embodying publisher’s
catalogue and publisher is willing to grant such right to license on a
non-exclusive basis.
The right to publicly perform and to authorize others to
perform the composition by means of a media entity not licensed
by ASCAP, BMI, or SESAC is subject to clearance of the performing
right either from Licensor or from any other duly authorized
licensor acting for or on behalf of Licensor subject to good faith
negotiations in accordance with established industry customs and
practices.
An issue in many agreements is what happens to the writer’s
share when a copyright owner, usually the music publisher, directly
licenses a work to a user. Clauses range from “payments to be made
based upon the prevailing PRO rates for the specific use,”
“compensation to be negotiated in good faith,” “reasonable fee,”
“fee subject to arbitration,” “a complete buyout with no further
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compensation or continuing royalties,” or “50% of any license fee
received.”
A further unresolved issue as to an allowable and effective
direct license under court or Consent Decree interpretation
involves the situation where a music user (e.g., traditional
broadcaster, online music service, etc.) contacts a copyright owner
directly with the request, versus the situation where the ASCAP or
BMI copyright owner approaches the user to negotiate a direct
license. This is a fine distinction, but an important one in current
litigation and Consent Decree interpretation.
VI. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE INTERVENTION
In part because of the Pandora decisions, a major development
occurred in June 2014 when the Department of Justice announced
that it would review both the ASCAP and BMI Consent Decrees “to
account for changes in how music is delivered to and experienced
88
by listeners . . . .” The Department allowed a sixty-day period for
comments from any interested party (e.g., music publishers,
songwriters and composers, PROs, online service companies, music
89
users of any nature, the general public, etc.).
A cross-section of some of the views was illustrative of the issues
as well as the diametrically opposed positions of many of the
parties. The comments very much reflected a creators versus users
scenario.
On the music user side, the National Association of
Broadcasters (NAB), the Digital Media Association (DiMA),
Netflix, Fox News, the RMLC, the National Restaurant Association,
and the Consumer Electronics Association, among others,
90
submitted comments. The creator/copyright representative side

88. Antitrust Consent Decree Review—ASCAP and BMI 2014, U.S. DEP’T JUST.,
http://www.justice.gov/atr/ascap-bmi-decree-review (last updated Dec. 16, 2015).
89. See id.
90. See National Association of Broadcasters, Comment on Antitrust Consent
Decree Review (Aug. 6, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/ascapbmi
/comments/307974.pdf; Digital Media Association, Comment on Antitrust
Consent Decree Review, http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/ascapbmi/comments
/307972.pdf (last visited Feb. 8, 2016); Netflix, Comments on Antitrust Consent
Decree Review (Aug. 6, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/ascapbmi
/comments/307908.pdf; Fox News, Comment on Antitrust Consent Decree
Review (Aug. 6, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/ascapbmi/comments
/307811.pdf; Radio Music License Committee, Comment on Antitrust Consent
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included comments from the performing right organizations
ASCAP, BMI, PRS for Music (U.K.), SOCAN (Canada), JASRAC
(Japan), SIAE (Italy), as well as the Society of Composers and
Lyricists (SCL—film and television composers), Nashville
Songwriters Association International (NSAI), the National Music
Publishers Association (NMPA), and the Screen Actors GuildAmerican Federation of Television and Radio Artists (SAG91
AFTRA), among others.
ASCAP, in its comments, requested that the Rate Court be
replaced with a faster and cheaper dispute resolution procedure,
that ASCAP be allowed to bundle and license multiple rights (the
current Decree prohibits ASCAP from licensing any right other
than performance), and allowed partial grants of rights from its
92
members. The arguments centered on the fact that new media
Decree Review (Aug. 6, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/ascapbmi
/comments/307977.pdf; Letter from David Matthews, Nat’l Restaurant Ass’n, to
John R. Read, U.S. Dep’t of Justice (July 22, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/atr
/cases/ascapbmi/comments/307607.pdf.
91. American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers, Comment
Regarding Review of the ASCAP and BMI Consent Decrees (Aug. 6, 2014), http://
www.justice.gov/atr/cases/ascapbmi/comments/307803.pdf; Broadcast Music,
Inc., Comments Regarding Review of BMI Consent Decree (Aug. 6, 2014), http://
www.justice.gov/atr/cases/ascapbmi/comments/307859.pdf; Memorandum from
Performing Right Soc’y, Ltd. on Review of ASCAP and BMI Consent Decrees, to
Chief, Litig. III Section, Antitrust Div. (Aug. 5, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/atr
/cases/ascapbmi/comments/307652.pdf; E-mail from Gilles Daigle, Soc’y of
Composers, Authors, & Music Publishers of Can., to Chief, Litig. III Section,
Antitrust Div. (Aug. 6, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/ascapbmi
/comments/307844.pdf; Letter from Satoshi Watanabe, Japanese Soc’y for Rights
of Authors, Composers, & Publishers, to Chief, Litig. III, Section Antitrust Division
(Aug. 5, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/ascapbmi/comments /307760
.pdf; E-mail from Societa’ Italiana Delgi Autori ed Editori, to Chief, Litig. III,
Section Antitrust Division (Aug. 5, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases
/ascapbmi/comments/307727.pdf; Society of Composers and Lyricists, Comment
on Antitrust Consent Decree Review as Pertaining to ASCAP and BMI (Aug. 6,
2014),
http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/ascapbmi/comments/307971.pdf;
Nashville Songwriters Association International, Comment on Review of ASCAP
and BMI Consent (Aug. 5, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/ascapbmi
/comments/307686.pdf; National Music Publishers’ Association, Comment
Regarding
Review
of
the
ASCAP
and
BMI
Consent
Decrees,
http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/ascapbmi/comments/307900.pdf (last visited
Feb. 8, 2016); Screen Actors Guild—American Federation of Television and Radio
Artists, Comments on Antitrust Consent Decree Review (Aug. 6, 2014), http://
www.justice.gov/atr/cases/ascapbmi/comments/307818.pdf.
92. See American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers, Comments
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users need multiple rights in their business; that publishers need
flexibility to manage rights and negotiate contracts terms; and that
property rights are divisible, assignable, and licensable either in
93
whole or in part. BMI, which is not prevented from bundling or
licensing multiple rights, requested that publishers be allowed to
withdraw digital rights and that a binding arbitration model replace
94
the Consent Decree mandate.
The SCL were in favor of Consent Decree changes and
expressed concerns that if the major music publishers withdrew
completely from ASCAP and BMI, “the transparency of
accountability currently afforded . . . by the PROs and the collective
95
licensing model” would be affected. The SCL further asserted that
in a bundled rights situation, it would be difficult to ascertain the
96
value of the performance right in bundled transactions. Most
writers in this field sign “work-for-hire” contracts where the back
end performance royalties represent a substantial portion of their
97
income. The 165,000-member organization, SAG-AFTRA, the
“largest labor union representing working media artists,”
commented that the “scales have tipped too far in favor of
licensees’ interests over those of the artists” and that the ratesetting process set forth by the Consent Decrees is inefficient,
expensive, and burdensome upon PROs and if not modified will
98
significantly devalue writers’ works.
Sony/ATV Music supported amending the Consent Decrees to
allow copyright owners the ability to limit the scope of the rights
they grant to ASCAP and BMI in their musical compositions and to
require PROs to accept those grants; supported an expedited
arbitration process for resolving rate disputes; and recommended
that the reviews of the Decrees occur periodically to take into
99
account new technology changes and conditions. Sony/ATV was
Regarding Review of the ASCAP and BMI Consent Decrees 3, 16 (Aug. 6, 2014),
http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/ascapbmi/comments/307803.pdf.
93. See id. at 16, 19–21.
94. See Broadcast Music, Inc., supra note 91, at 2.
95. See Society of Composers and Lyricists, supra note 91, at 2.
96. Id.
97. See id. at 1 (describing the uniqueness of American work-for-hire
contracts).
98. Screen Actors Guild—American Federation of Television and Radio
Artists, supra note 91, at 3.
99. See Sony/ATV Music Publishing LLC, Comments on ASCAP and BMI
Consent Decrees, at 1–2 (Aug. 6, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases
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not in favor of allowing PROs to handle rights other than
performing rights, as it was their position that these markets
already functioned well and that the introduction of such regulated
entities into the market for these other rights would be “costly and
100
disruptive.”
As to the foreign performing right organizations who
submitted comments, widespread concern centered on the belief
that the current Consent Decrees were outdated in today’s world
and that changes were essential if music was to be appropriately
101
licensed and compensated.
Partial grants of rights and the
bundling of multiple rights are commonplace in the foreign
marketplace, and dispute resolution procedures are less
102
cumbersome than the U.S. Rate Court. PRS for Music in the
U.K., which receives over $100 million a year in U.S. performance
royalties for its members from ASCAP and BMI, expressed
concerns over the present Decrees and stated that they would
consider licensing the British repertory directly in the United States
103
rather than through intermediaries if it proved more efficient.
DIMA, a trade organization whose members include Apple,
Amazon, Microsoft, and YouTube, stated that the Decrees have not
harmed ASCAP or BMI financially in terms of the music industry
generally, and that PROs must be subject to oversight as their anti104
competitive behavior continues to this day. Further, if the Justice
Department does allow all PROs to bundle rights, as well as allow
partial withdrawals, then substantial oversight must be put in place
and songwriters must be allowed to keep their rights with their
PRO if that’s what they wanted regardless of whether the publisher
105
removed the works.
The RMLC strongly felt that the Decrees were necessary to
106
keep the market power of ASCAP and BMI in check. Also, if
publishers were allowed to withdraw from PROs, they could

/ascapbmi/comments/307983.pdf.
100. Id. at 26.
101. See, e.g., Memorandum from Performing Right Soc’y, Ltd., supra note 91,
at 2; Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers, supra note 91, at 1;
Societa’ Italiana Delgi Autori ed Editori, supra note 91, at 1–2.
102. Memorandum from Performing Right Soc’y, Ltd., supra note 91, at 3.
103. Id. at 2.
104. Digital Media Association, supra note 90.
105. Id. at 23.
106. Radio Music License Committee, supra note 90.
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leverage their outsize market share to extract exorbitant license
fees from licensees. Both the NAB and TMLC also shared these
107
views. As to Netflix, their position was that the Decrees were in
108
place to constrain PROs’ market power.
They were against
allowing partial publisher withdrawals, but if the Department
allowed them, then conditions would have to be imposed to
109
mitigate any adverse consequences. Finally, the Rate Court must
stay in place, though it does need to be streamlined.
VII. SOUND RECORDINGS
Prior to 1972, no federal copyright protection existed for
sound recordings. Congress rectified that situation by extending
copyright to any recordings that were fixed on or after February 15,
110
1972. The owners of the copyright, therefore, had the exclusive
right to reproduce and distribute phonorecords embodying the
sound recording, including by means of digital transmission, and to
111
authorize others to do the same.
Pre-February 15, 1972,
recordings remained subject to the protection afforded by state
112
laws.
As to the performance right aspect of sound recordings, the
right that was enjoyed by musical compositions was non-existent for
records. No performance royalty existed in any medium for sound
113
recordings. That changed in 1995 with the passage of the Digital
Performance Rights in Sound Recordings Act (DPRSRA), which
provided for a limited right when sound recordings are publicly
114
performed “by means of a digital audio transmission.” The 1998
107. See National Association of Broadcasters, Comment Regarding Antitrust
Consent Decree Review, *2 (Aug. 6, 2014), http://www.nab.org/documents
/newsRoom/pdfs/080614_DOJ_consent_decree_comments.pdf.
108. Netflix, supra note 90.
109. Id. at 9.
110. See Sound Recording Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92–140, 85 Stat. 391. But see
Eric Charles Osterberg, Should Sound Recordings Really Be Treated Differently than
Other Copyrighted Works? The Illogic of Bridgeport v. Dimension Films, 53 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 619, 631 (2006).
111. Osterberg, supra note 110, at 633–37.
112. See Goldstein v. California¸ 412 U.S. 546, 552 (1973).
113. Joshua D. Levine, Dancing to a New Tune, A Digital One: The Digital
Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, 20 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 624, 628
(1996).
114. Digital Performance Rights in Sound Recordings Act, Pub. L. No. 104–
39, 109 Stat. 336 (1995).
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Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) included webcasting as
a category of performance applicable to this limited performance
115
right. This new right applied specifically to satellite radio (e.g.
Sirius XM), internet radio (e.g. Pandora), and cable television
116
music channels (e.g. Music Choice). Broadcast radio continued
117
to be exempt.
It is important to note that the statutory license applies only to
118
non-interactive services. The right to perform copyrighted sound
recordings for on-demand services (interactive services) remains
with the copyright owner (normally the label) and is a negotiated
119
agreement between the label and the music user. These deals
have taken many forms, including percentage of gross or net
revenue formulas, per performance rates, an equity stake in the
business, or a combination of these and other elements.
The rates and terms of the sound recording statutory license
are set by the Copyright Royalty Board (CRB), an administrative
120
body created by Congress.
SoundExchange, a non-profit
organization, has been designated by the Librarian of Congress and
the CRB to be the sole entity to collect, administer, and distribute
the royalties from non-interactive webcasting, digital cable and
121
satellite transmissions, and satellite audio services. Congress also
gave SoundExchange the right to negotiate agreements separate
from those set by the CRB through the Webcaster Settlement Acts
122
of 2008 and 2009. Services therefore can choose whether to be
licensed under the CRB rates or the SoundExchange negotiated
rates.
There are five major sound recording licensing categories,
123
each of which is subject to a separate rate proceeding. The
categories are webcasting, satellite radio, pre-existing music
115. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105–304, § 405, 112 Stat.
2860 (1998).
116. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 112, 114 (2012).
117. Id. §§ 112(a)(1), 114(d)(1).
118. Id. § 114(d)(2).
119. Id. § 114(d)(3)(C).
120. Id. § 801.
121. SOUNDEXCHANGE, http://www.soundexchange.com (last visited Feb. 8,
2016).
122. Webcaster Settlement Act, Pub. L. No. 110–435, 112 Stat. 4974 (2008);
Webcaster Settlement Act, Pub. L. No. 111–36, 123 Stat. 1926 (2009); see also 17
U.S.C. § 114(f)(5).
123. See 17 U.S.C. § 114(f)(2)–(3).
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services, other cable and satellite music providers, and business
establishments. An example of a rate proceeding involved Sirius
XM satellite radio; the proceeding concluded in 2012 and set rates
at 9% of gross revenue for a five-year period beginning in 2013,
124
and increasing to 11% in 2017.
Webcasting IV—the proceeding regarding future webcasting
rates—commenced in early 2014 and concluded at the end of 2015
125
and set rates for the period 2016 through 2020. Recent five-year
CRB per performance statutory webcasting rates were $0.0019 for
126
2011, $0.0021 for 2012 and 2013, and $0.0023 for 2014 and 2015.
The Webcaster Settlement Acts of 2008 and 2009 allowed
SoundExchange to negotiate alternative royalty rates (“Pureplay”
127
rates) with certain webcasters. For non-subscription services and
broadcasters streaming their content on the internet, the
“Pureplay” per performance rate started as $0.00102 for 2011 and
128
increased to $0.0013 in 2014 and $0.0014 in 2015. The rate
applicable is the greater of the per performance rate or 25% of
129
U.S. gross revenue. The “Pureplay” per performance rate for
subscription services started at $0.0017 in 2011 and increased to
130
$0.0023 and $0.0025 for 2014 and 2015, respectively.
No
131
percentage of revenue figures applied to the subscription rate.
Under those agreements, Webcasters therefore had a choice to be
licensed through 2015 either with the CRB rates or the
SoundExchange “Pureplay” rates.
As to the current Webcasting IV CRB proceeding,
SoundExchange’s rate proposal for the 2016–2020 period was a
“greater of” formula taking into account a per-performance rate
132
and a percentage of the service’s revenue. Specifically, the per124. In re Determination of Rates and Terms for Preexisting Subscription
Servs. and Satellite Dig. Audio Radio Servs., No. 2011-1 (C.R.B. Dec. 14, 2012),
http://www.loc.gov/crb/comments/2012-12/Public_Initial_Determination.pdf.
125. See In re Determination of Royalty Rates and Terms for Ephemeral
Recording and Digital Performance of Sound Recordings (Webcasting IV), No. 14CRB-0001-WR (C.R.B. 2014).
126. 37 C.F.R. § 380.3(a)(1) (2014).
127. Notification of Agreements Under the Webcaster Settlement Act of 2009,
74 Fed. Reg. 34,796, 34,796–97 (July 17, 2009).
128. Id. at 34,799.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. See id.
132. Introductory Memorandum to the Written Direct Statement of
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performance rate for commercial webcasters would commence at
133
The
$0.0025 in 2016, then escalate to $0.0029 in 2020.
percentage of revenue figure would be 55% of attributable revenue
134
from activities in the United States for all five years.
Noncommercial webcaster per-performance rates would be the same as
the commercial rates but would only contain a minimum fee and
135
no percentage of revenue calculation. Their proposal was based
on the facts that webcasting is a vibrant and growing industry, that
it has widespread adoption by consumers, and that direct licensing
deals between record companies and on demand services
(interactive streaming) were the most appropriate benchmarks to
use. A review of these deals confirmed that the record companies
received a minimum share of 50% to 60% of a service’s revenue
with allocations based on each record company’s share of total
136
streams.
Music services, on the other hand, argued in their case that the
industry is not profitable even considering payments under the
137
reduced Webcaster Settlement Act agreements.
Pandora’s
proposal for non-subscription services was a per-performance rate
of $0.0011 in 2016 increasing to $0.00118 in 2020, a subscription
rate $0.00215 in 2016 increasing to $0.0023 in 2020, and a “greater
138
of” figure that is 25% of revenue. iHeartMedia and the NAB
proposed a per-performance rate of $0.0005 for five years with no

SoundExchange, Inc. at 1, Webcasting IV, No. 14-CRB-0001-WR (C.R.B. Oct. 7,
2014),
http://www.loc.gov/crb/rate/14-CRB-0001-WR/statements/SX/1A
_Introductory_Memorandum.pdf.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 2.
136. See id. at 13.
137. See generally Written Direct Testimony of Michael Herring at 2–3,
Webcasting IV, No. 14-CRB-0001-WR (C.R.B. Oct. 6, 2014), http://www.loc.gov/crb
/rate/14-CRB-0001WR/statements/Pandora/11_Written_Direct_Testimony_of
_Michael_Herring_with_Exhibits_PUBLIC_pdf; Testimony of David B. Packman at
3,
Webcasting
IV,
No.
14-CRB-0001-WR
(C.R.B.
Oct.
7,
2014),
http://www.loc.gov/crb/rate/14-CRB-0001WR/statements/iHeartMedia/Vol
%205_01%20Testimony%20of%20D%20Pakman/2014_10_07_Testimony_of_D
_Pakman_with_Appendices.pdf.
138. Proposed Rates and Terms of Pandora, Inc. at 1–2, Webcasting IV, No. 14CRB-0001-WR (C.R.B. Oct. 7, 2014), http://www.loc.gov/crb/rate/14-CRB
-0001WR/statements/Pandora/2_Pandora_ Proposed_Rates_and_Terms_pdf.pdf.
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139

percentage of revenue alternative. Any direct licenses entered
140
into would be excluded from the calculations.
On December 16, 2015, the CRB issued their written
determination as to the royalty rates and terms applicable to the
digital performance of sound recordings over the Internet by
141
nonexempt, non-interactive transmission services (webcasters).
The rate for commercial subscription services in 2016 is
$0.0022 per performance with commercial nonsubscription services
142
at $0.0017 per performance. The rates for 2017 through 2020 for
both types of services shall be adjusted to reflect the increases or
decreases as measured by the Consumer Price Index applicable to
that rate year. In addition, the rates for noncommercial webcasters
are $500 annually for each station or channel for all webcast
transmissions totaling not more than 159,140 Aggregate Tuning
Hours (ATH) with a per performance rate of $0.0017 for any
143
performances in excess of the ATH figure.
The “greater of [percentage] of revenue versus per
performance rate” (Revenue Share) concept, as set forth in the
prior Webcaster Settlement Acts, was not included in the 2016-2020
144
rate determination. CRB decisions are appealable to the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit within
thirty days after publication of the determination in the Federal
145
Register.
VIII. SOUNDEXCHANGE DISTRIBUTIONS AND DIRECT LICENSES
The total of all royalties collected by SoundExchange in 2014
was $788 million, with the statutory license accounting for $755
139. Written Direct Statement of the National Association of Broadcasters
app. B at 3–4, Webcasting IV, No. 14-CRB-0001-WR (C.R.B. Oct. 7, 2014),
http://www.loc.gov/crb/rate/14-CRB-0001WR/statements/NAB/NAB_FINAL
_VOLUME_1_PUBLIC.pdf; Proposed Rates and Terms of iHeartMedia, Inc. at 1,
Webcasting IV, No. 14-CRB-0001-WR (C.R.B. Oct. 7, 2014), http://www.loc.gov/crb
/rate/14-CRB-0001WR/statements/iHeartMedia/Vol%201_Introductory
%20Documents/Vol_1_02_2014_10_07_Rate_and_Terms_Proposal.pdf.
140. See 17 U.S.C. § 114(3) (2014).
141. See Current Developments, COPYRIGHT ROYALTY BOARD (Dec. 16, 2015),
https://www.loc.gov/crb/.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. See 4 WEST’S FED. ADMIN. PRAC. § 4018, Westlaw (database updated July
2015).
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146

million of that figure.
The remaining collections represent
royalties received from non-statutory services, including foreign
147
country collective management organizations.
Total gross
distributions were $773 million to artists and sound recording
148
copyright owners. Royalty distributions are allocated 50% to
sound recording copyright owners (many times the label), 45% to
featured artists, and 2.5% each to non-featured musicians and nonfeatured vocalists via the Intellectual Property Rights Distribution
Fund, administered by the American Federation of Musicians
149
(AFM) and the SAG-AFTRA.
As to the amount of sound
recording royalties coming in from foreign countries, it is
important to note that it is limited based on the reciprocal right
being administered in each country. As the U.S. sound recording
performance right is a very limited one (non-interactive streaming
primarily), it substantially reduces the amount of royalties coming
into the United States for overseas sound recording performances.
Finally, in the case of rights owners wishing to directly license
their works to non-interactive services and not rely on the statutory
license or SoundExchange separately negotiated deals,
SoundExchange does offer administration services to both labels as
well as artists for those works.
IX. PRE-1972 SOUND RECORDINGS
As previously mentioned, sound recordings fixed prior to
February 15, 1972, are not subject to copyright under § 301(c), and
further, any rights they do have depend solely on whatever rights
150
are afforded to sound recording owners under state law.

146. SOUNDEXCHANGE, SOUNDEXCHANGE ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2014 PROVIDED
PURSUANT TO 37 C.F.R. § 370.5(C) 4 (2015), http://www.soundexchange.com/wp
-content/uploads/2015/03/2014-SoundExchange-Fiscal-Report-_FINAL-REPORT
_ISSUED_3-31-2015.pdf.
147. Id. at 4 n.2.
148. Id.
149. 17 U.S.C. § 114(g)(2)(A)–(D) (2014).
150. 17 U.S.C. § 301(c); see also Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., 62
F. Supp. 3d 325, 336 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“Recordings ‘fixed’ (recorded) prior to
February 15, 1972 were not, and still are not, eligible for federal copyright
protection.”); Capitol Records, Inc. v. Naxos of Am., Inc., 830 N.E.2d 250, 252
(N.Y. 2005) (“Sound recordings produced after February 15, 1972 can be
protected from infringement under federal copyright law but Congress did not
extend statutory protection to recordings created before that date.”).
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In September 2014, in the U.S. District Court for the Central
District of California case Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc.,
the court ruled in a motion for summary judgment that copyright
ownership of a sound recording under the California statute
151
includes the right to publicly perform the recording. The court
further held that Sirius XM’s streaming of the 1960s band The
Turtles’ pre-1972 recordings without authorization and without
152
paying royalties constituted copyright infringement.
In
November 2014, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
New York ruled in Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc. that
Sirius had committed copyright infringement and engaged in
unfair competition by publicly performing sound recordings
153
owned by Flo & Eddie. These cases and their appeals, as well as
similar pending cases regarding the same or similar issues, need to
be watched as they will have a very significant impact on future
sound recording license fees as well as royalties to labels and
154
artists.
X. WHERE DO WE NOW STAND?
Of the two performance areas under discussion—musical
composition rights and sound recording rights—the sound
recording seems much clearer than the composition side. The
sound recording performance right, at least for now, is a very
limited right (traditional radio, for example, is not included) and
has a statutory scheme in place with rates set by either the CRB, by
SoundExchange with users, or by direct negotiations between
copyright owners and users. Over the past ten years, this has been,
percentage-wise, by far the biggest growth area for sound recording
copyright owners. Though the status of pre-1972 sound recordings
is not yet finalized, all indications are that significant royalties will
start to flow for this category of works.
151. Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Flo & Eddie,
No. CV 13-5693 PSG (RZx), 2014 WL 4725382, (C.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2014).
152. Id.
153. Memorandum Decision & Order Denying Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment, Flo & Eddie, 62 F. Supp. 3d 325 (No. 13 Civ. 5784(CM)), 2014
WL 6670201.
154. Flo & Eddie, No. 13 Civ. 5784(CM), 2014 WL 6670201 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14,
2014), appeal docketed, No. 15-1164 (2d Cir. 2015); Flo & Eddie, No. CV 13-5693 PSG
(RZx), 2014 WL 4725382 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2014), appeal docketed, No. 15-80102
(9th Cir. 2015).
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The musical composition performance right, on the other
hand, has more questions and unresolved issues in the licensing
process than ever before. Not only are there unresolved Rate Court
cases and issues affecting every aspect of the licensing of music in
the “new media” world (not to mention the effect on traditional
media licensing), but also the entrance into the field of new types
of PRO models (e.g., music publishers, business entities,
administration services, foreign territory rights management
organizations, etc.) which could, depending on one’s point of view,
significantly complicate the existing licensing structure for music
users, achieve “willing buyer, willing seller” market rates for the
creative community and their representatives, strengthen the
arguments for licensing through the traditional PRO model,
weaken the current traditional PRO structures, increase license fees
and royalties in some areas with reductions in others, initiate an era
of PRO selective administration services only, and create new writer
and music publisher royalty payment formulas, values,
compensation plans, guarantee arrangements, competitive
matching payment systems, royalty advance deals, bonus and
“rewards for success” policies as well as other financial incentive
plans, among other possibilities and results.
In addition, the direct licensing of works by copyright owners,
never a major factor in the past, has taken on new significance in
not only the online “new media” world of music licensing, but also
in traditional media music licensing practices. Finally, the
Department of Justice review of the ASCAP and BMI Consent
Decrees, in effect since 1941, could have a significant effect on the
future of music performance licensing, assuming that any changes
encompass more than just minor modifications.
The foreign marketplace, responsible for the collection of an
excess of $1.5 billion in annual U.S. writer and publisher
performance fees, represents an additional area of concern
regarding the stability, continuation, and accuracy of “overseas”
royalty collections and payments. The issues in this area are more
significant for songwriters and composers than music publishers, as
many publishers collect their monies directly from foreign societies
as direct members or via sub-publishers. For successful songwriters,
film and television composers, and writer estates, foreign
royalties—for many, easily in excess of 50% of their short-term and
long-term royalty income—have always flowed through the societies
through reciprocal agreements. Therefore, any change in those
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relationships could have a major impact on the ability to license,
track, audit, collect, and receive foreign country songwriter and
composer royalties.
The best advice for the future—in all of your deals,
negotiations, and contracts—prepare for every contingency and
possibility,” as they may very well come true.
Welcome to the “new world of performance licensing.”

